Portfolio item number 1
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Published in Journal 1, 2009
This paper is about the number 1. The number 2 is left for future work.
Recommended citation: Your Name, You. (2009). "Paper Title Number 1." Journal 1. 1(1).
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Published in Journal 1, 2010
This paper is about the number 2. The number 3 is left for future work.
Recommended citation: Your Name, You. (2010). "Paper Title Number 2." Journal 1. 1(2).
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Published in Journal 1, 2015
This paper is about the number 3. The number 4 is left for future work.
Recommended citation: Your Name, You. (2015). "Paper Title Number 3." Journal 1. 1(3).
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Published in GitHub Journal of Bugs, 2024
This paper is about fixing template issue #693.
Recommended citation: Your Name, You. (2024). "Paper Title Number 3." GitHub Journal of Bugs. 1(3).
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Published in GitHub Journal of Bugs, 2024
This paper is about a famous math equation, \(E=mc^2\)
Recommended citation: Your Name, You. (2024). "Paper Title Number 3." GitHub Journal of Bugs. 1(3).
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Published:
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Published:
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, , 1900
JOB MARKET PAPER • “Politics-driven Market Access and Its Cost:Evidence from China’s Grand Canal.” (with Ying Bai and Ruixue Jia). – This study adopts the market access approach in spatial economics, examining the historical case of China’s Grand Canal in the context of national capital relocations from Tang to Qing Dynasties. Using a grid-year level panel data covering the 8th century to 19th century, we find that (1) the national capital was relocated from the China central (the Tang and Song dynasties) to China north (Yuan, Ming and Qing dynasties) resulted in the redefinition of the Grand Canal to directly connect the national capital to the properous China south. Specifically, the optimal route to the national capital could predict the actual canal route. (2) It also changed each region’s market access and hence reshape the economic geography. 1% increase in market access and lead to 0.14% increase in population density. (3) Overall, The politics-driven canal construction enhance the aggregate welfare. Counterfactual analysis show that removing all canals could lead to 4% - 11% percent decrease in total population, which shows that although the canal route is motivated by political consideration, it still benifits the overall economy. (4) But, it also caused misallocation. If we assume that Ming and Qing dynasties adopted the Song canal, it is observed 2.5% - 4% increase in total population. This paper not only examines how politics determine the positioning of transportation networks and consequently regional economic development but also the change of aggregate welfare, allowing us to evaluate the cost of politics-driven transportation networks.